Give agents authority.Keep the final say.
Securely connect your AI agents to real-world tools. Pakkawork enforces strict governance policies, requires human approval for sensitive actions, and logs every outcome to an immutable evidence ledger.
Overview
5 actions · 5 agents · 3 blocked by policy · Illustrative demo data
2
1 critical risk
38%
of today's units
18
all verified
8s
policy to result
5
1 suspended
3
by locked rules
Recent actions
View allSend Q3 investor update
ops-agent · High risk
Share revenue model with finance
sheets-agent · Medium risk
Archive 2024 Drive folder
drive-agent · Critical risk
Create onboarding calendar event
calendar-agent · Low risk
Activity
Blocked by locked policy: auto-forwarding
Enable inbox forwarding · 12m ago
Approved by 2 distinct humans · executed
Send Q3 investor update · 2h ago
Verified after execution
Create onboarding calendar event · 5h ago
Signed into the evidence ledger
Post release notes to Chat · 1d ago
Sarvam AI
Selected into Sarvam AI's startup program and received startup credits.
Kiro
Selected into Kiro's startup program and received startup credits.
MongoDB
Selected into MongoDB's startup program and received startup credits.
Connect your AI agents to thousands of applications instantly. We handle the authentication, rate limits, and infrastructure so you can focus on building.
1000+
Integrations
Pre-built connectors for every major SaaS platform
50M+
API calls routed
Reliably processing high-volume agent traffic daily
99.9%
Uptime
Enterprise-grade reliability for production agents
The action happens in one call.
So does the damage.
A community analysis flagged 92% of MCP servers as high risk, and security teams report that a single injected document can trigger real tool calls — no approval, no evidence.
The ungoverned agent — plays out every day
Agent (ungoverned)
no approval · no audit trail
Type a message
No approval = no proof = no way back.
What happens with no control plane
Irreversible action, no approval
The mail is sent, the file is shared. There is no undo and nobody signed off.
No proof of what actually ran
Scattered logs rarely show the exact arguments used, or who permitted them.
Over-broad scopes go unchecked
One consent screen grants far more than the task needed, and never gets narrowed.
Little you can do after the fact
Any review starts with evidence. Without it, you start from behind.
Pakkawork fixes this.
Policy before supported execution, humans when approval is required, every provider result recorded, and post-condition checks only where implemented.
See how it worksThis isn't hypothetical. Real engineers, right now.
Teams running MCP in production ask about the real security risks
“Risks like prompt injection, tool poisoning, or hidden data exfiltration seem quite real.”
Sep 2025Analysis shared on r/cybersecurity finds most MCP servers carry high risk
“Tool poisoning, prompt injection, over-scoped OAuth, and output handling issues.”
2026Engineers debugging agents that fail silently want a tool-call audit trail
“Having a tool call audit trail is honestly the most useful thing you can add early.”
2026Security teams describe indirect injection turning into real tool calls
“An indirect injection in a retrieved document can trigger tool calls, exfiltrate data.”
2026Practitioners report agent builds that cannot be audited after the fact
“Bleeding tokens, can't be audited, and falls over the moment a real edge case appears.”
2026MCP security concerns raised repeatedly by people running agent systems
“MCP security is a real and urgent issue … threats like tool poisoning.”
2026Public MCP configs scanned on GitHub show exfiltration risk
“Analyze tool descriptions for prompt injection/poisoning … exfiltration risk.”
2026Teams ask how to control what data their agents can actually reach
“Control permissions tightly without custom solutions.”
2025Discussion on separating agent execution from governance
“Decoupling execution from governance in multi-agent setups.”
2026Tool-call interception is being built as a security layer for agents
“Intercepts tool calls, blocks prompt injection, prevents exfiltration.”
2026These are public engineering and security discussions from third-party platforms, linked for informational purposes. Pakkawork is not affiliated with these platforms or the people who posted them. These are NOT Pakkawork customer testimonials. Third-party trademarks belong to their respective owners.
Questions,
answered.
Ingress, risk, approvals, execution, verification, credentials, and evidence — with the product boundaries stated plainly.
Any agent or framework can use Pakkawork's MCP 2025-06-18 JSON-RPC or REST ingress. The architecture is provider-agnostic, with Google Workspace first. A request proceeds to execution only when it resolves to a supported contract in Gmail, Calendar, Drive, Sheets, or Docs; catalogue-only contracts remain metadata.
Ready to govern your first agent?
MCP 2025-06-18 · REST · Server-side enforcement